General

Assume a complex proposition of the form ‘S↴, although ↴S’. ↴S is the concessive proposition. All such complex propositions share the following properties:

1. A conditional ‘if ↴S, not S↴’ (q → ¬p) is presupposed.
2. ↴S is taken for granted.
3. S↴ is asserted.

The presupposition #1 is normally grounded in a causal relation between S↴ and ↴S. Consider, for instance, a concessive construction such as .

Such a sentence involves the presupposition ‘if I exert myself, I should pass the exam,’ which it contradicts. The presupposition is understood to be based on a causal relation between exerting oneself and passing exams. In this respect, concessive constructions are semantically based on causal constructions. By the combination of conditions #2 and #3, the speaker denies the conditional (thus trying to cancel it from the universe of discourse).

Subtypes of concessive relations are generated by the following alternatives:

1. As for the above condition #2, the proposition ↴S of the subordinate clause may either be factive or be assumed hypothetically.
2. As for the above condition #1, the conditional relation between S↴ and ↴S may hinge on some degree to which ↴S is the case.

Accordingly, the following subsections are devoted to factive vs. conditional concessives and to indifferent concessives.

Conditional and factive concessives

In a conditional concessive (), the subordinate proposition (↴S) is explicitly assumed rather than presupposed. is an example.

The conditional concessive combines two independent features:

1. It explicitly assumes the protasis ↴S. It is, consequently, a conditional.
2. It presupposes the implication q → ¬p and contradicts it. It is, consequently, a concessive.

For this reason, the construction is called both conditional concessive and concessive conditional in the literature and in the present script. The concessive conditional is also treated as a subtype of the conditional.

In a factive concessive (), the speaker takes the reality of ↴S for granted. ↴S seems to be asserted rather than presupposed.¹ The clause representing ↴S thus defined is a (factive) concessive clause. In English, most factive concessive clauses are introduced by (al)though.²

Just as the conditional concessive bears the said paradigmatic relation to a conditional, contradicting it, so a factive concessive bears a paradigmatic, viz. a contradictory, relation to a causal clause: It presupposes the relation '↴S causes ¬p' and contradicts it. Thus, presupposes the causal relation ‘because I exerted myself, I did not flunk the exam’ and contradicts it.

Indifferent concessives

In a variety of the concessive relation, ↴S involves variation on some parameter and the presupposed conditional concerns a certain value on this parameter which would prevent the realization of S↴. Such an indifferent concessive relation may be coded by an indifferent (relative) clause of the kind of .

The two binary subdivisions of concessive relations are logically independent and cross-classify. is an indifferent conditional concessive.

¹ The negation test on presupposition status is not easily applied to a sentence such as .

² The English conjunction although nicely illustrates the necessity of distinguishing between the onomasiological and the semasiological approach: All factive concessive clauses may be introduced by although; but not every clause introduced by although is a factive concessive clause. In the sentence “Dowty ... proposes ... a different decomposition system from the one presented here, although this system has many features in common with Dowty's proposal.” (Van Valin & La Polla 1997:655), no concessive relation between the two propositions is involved, since the second proposition is not meant to be an obstacle to the first one. This use of although appears to involve a kind of corrective contrast.